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1  Background
In many regions, electricity demand varies significantly based on time of day. The differ-
ence in electricity demand between peak and off-peak time periods has increased annu-
ally in Japan.1 A decreased load factor implies a high adjustment of electricity supply. 
Thus, electricity suppliers must increase the electricity price, which might lead to a 
decrease in consumer welfare. To reduce the demand gap between peak and off-peak 
time periods, demand-side control of energy use is an important tool to consider. In fact, 
the Japanese government is considering the introduction of dynamic pricing rules to 
decrease the electricity demand gap between peak and off-peak time periods.2
Dynamic pricing can reduce electricity demand by increasing the electricity rate when 
the electricity demand is strong. Electricity rates decrease when electricity demand 
weakens. The concept of dynamic pricing is based on economic incentives. Many previ-
ous studies (for example, Joskow 1975; Chao and Pecks 1996) analyze how to make the 
effective dynamic pricing rule maximize total welfare. Based on a theoretical analysis, 
several researchers have implemented field experiments to evaluate the performance 
of dynamic pricing rules. The empirical results of such field experiments show that 
1 According to the Agency for Natural Resources and Energy in Japan, the power demand of the household sector has 
increased due to the improvement of living standards. In the household sector, which widely uses air-conditioning and 
electric carpet, power demand is substantial on hot days of summer and cold days of winter.
2 With the introduction of the demand response, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry has expressed the view 
that the demand response can bring a new energy-saving mechanism to Japan. In addition, the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry believes that this system can prevent black outs of the power supply. For more information, see the 
following Web site: http://www.meti.go.jp/committee/sougouenergy/shoene_shinene/sho_ene/pdf/006_03_00.pdf.
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dynamic pricing can contribute to decreasing peak-time electricity demand (Matsukawa 
et al. 2000; Faruqui and George 2005; Herter 2007). In addition, Allcott (2011) indicates 
that dynamic pricing can contribute to increasing the consumer surplus.
However, there remains an important policy question regarding dynamic pricing: Even 
if dynamic pricing rules have been theoretically effective, it is unclear whether consum-
ers actually accept dynamic pricing rules. Joskow and Wolfram (2012) note that there are 
several factors that prevent consumers from accepting dynamic pricing rules. One rea-
son they note is the cost of metering. Metering would be too costly for small commercial 
consumers. Furthermore, consumers might not easily understand the effectiveness of 
potentially complex designs of dynamic pricing.
We investigate whether consumers accept dynamic pricing using a choice experiment. 
We estimate willingness to pay (WTP) from the results of a choice experiment. Then, we 
analyze the most preferable dynamic pricing rules for consumers. There are several pre-
vious studies related to our study. Borenstein (2006) estimated the number of consumers 
who take risk aversion action. Risk aversion implies the avoidance of an electric pricing 
rule with high volatility, such as real-time pricing (RTP). Borenstein (2006) found that 
77% of consumers investigated were risk averse. In addition, Borenstein (2013) found 
that consumers tend to remain in the flat-rate fee scheme. He also used field experi-
ment data to analyze what characteristics of consumers lead them to switch to other 
electricity rates. As a result, he noted that low-income consumers tend to switch from a 
flat-rate scheme to a dynamic pricing scheme. A dynamic pricing scheme has the possi-
bility to improve several energy problems, such as energy conservation and mitigation of 
CO2 emissions. But, an effective dynamic pricing scheme requires the joining of several 
types of consumers (Kurakawa et al. 2016). Therefore, understanding consumer prefer-
ences for each dynamic pricing rule is important in actually implementing a dynamic 
pricing scheme. Furthermore, some researchers have noted that consumers may prefer 
an energy management system that automatically adjusts electricity usage to a dynamic 
pricing scheme. Therefore, we add the analysis of the preference for direct load con-
trol (DLC), which does not require the risky price change of electricity to consumers; 
instead, it automatically adjusts the rate based on use.
2  Data and setting of choice experiment
2.1  Data collection
We conducted a web-based questionnaire survey from March 14, 2014, to March 18, 
2014, using randomly selected consumers living in Japan. The purpose of this sur-
vey was to clarify what types of dynamic electricity pricing are preferred by consum-
ers using a choice experiment. The subjects of our survey included males and females 
aged 20–69 years. The number of subjects was 4122. The survey area included all prefec-
tures in Japan. Our questionnaire included choice experiments of an electricity pricing 
scheme and collected other information on each respondent. Details about the choice 
experiment are explained in the next section. Other variables from the questionnaire 
results of each respondent are described in Table 1. Our questionnaire includes general 
questions (such as age, gender and academic record) and questions about the use of elec-
tricity for the family. 
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2.2  Choice experiment modeling
In the survey, we used a choice experiment. We presented respondents information 
about the demand response (for details on the information given to correspondents is 
shown in Additional file 1: Appendix). Respondents were asked to cast eight decisions 
during the experiment. Although the contents of options changed each time, option 
6 (general pricing rule) remained the same. (Option 6 was the general pricing rule. In 
short, consumers did not change the pricing rule). The general pricing rule is the most 
common option in Japan. The order of the choice set was random, and the contents of 
the choice set were different for each respondent. Each time, the value of the “monthly 
fee” (the variable name was “month”) and the “initial cost” (the variable name is “first”) 
was randomly changed. The initial cost for the introduction of the demand response is 
one important factor that determines whether consumers join new pricing schemes. To 
control the initial cost effect for decision making, we added the initial cost as the basic 
attribute to the questionnaire. Respondents chose one option they found optimal. The 
general pricing rule (option 6) did not change the monthly electricity rate. Before ask-
ing the question in the choice experiment, we explained each dynamic pricing rule to 
respondents (see Additional file 1: Appendix).
Specifically, we asked respondents the following questions: “Among the following six 
electricity pricing alternatives, please select one you think is most preferable. The elec-
tricity rate you pay will be always supposed to satisfy your budget constraints. Please 
note that you will be able to freely spend the extra money you obtain from choosing the 
pricing.”
3  Estimation method
3.1  Conditional logit model
We assume a random utility model for the analysis. When subject n chooses profile i, 
the subject’s utility is given by Un,i = Vn,i + ɛn,i where Vn,i is the observable component 
of Un,i and ɛn,i is the unobservable component of Un,i. We denote the set of profiles that 
subject n can select on the basis of C = {1, 2, …, j}. The probability that subject n chooses 
Table 1 Estimation result of conditional logit
The number of observation is 197,856 (4122 respondents × 8 times questions × 6 options). Log likelihood is −71,657.017, 
and χ2 (7) is 19,494.09
Attributes Definition Coefficient t value
TOU (If respondents choose TOU = 1, if respondents choose other pricing 
scheme = 0)
0.350 14.180
CPP (If respondents choose CPP = 1, if respondents choose other pricing 
scheme = 0)
0.151 6.110
RTP (If respondents choose RTP = 1, if respondents choose other pricing 
scheme = 0)
0.308 12.720
DLC (If respondents choose DLC = 1, if respondents choose other pricing 
scheme = 0)
0.312 10.610
DLCCPP (If respondents choose DLCCPP = 1, if respondents choose other pricing 
scheme = 0)
0.207 7.050
Month Willingness to pay for electricity fee per month of each option  
(Japanese yen)
−0.00012 −93.060
First Willingness to pay for first fixed fee in each option (Japanese yen) −0.00006 −33.400
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 must be satisfied. 
Then, we obtain
Following McFadden (1973), we assume that εn,i and εn,j are independent with a uni-
variate type I extreme value distribution. Then, the probability that subject n chooses 
profile i is
where μ is a scale parameter. In this paper, μ is normalized to 1. This model is known as a 
conditional logit model. Hence, we obtain the log-likelihood function:
where N is the number of subjects, and δni is the dummy variable, such that δni = 1 if sub-
ject n chooses profile i and 0 otherwise. By maximizing the log-likelihood function, we 
estimate the parameters.3
3.2  Marginal willingness to pay (MWTP)
Vn,i is the observable component of the utility of individual n when choosing the ith 
option. The utility component is assumed to have the following linear form:
where di is the alternative-specific constant and pi is the price of option i. ai and β are 
parameters. Assuming that Vn,i is equal to the observable component of the utility asso-
ciated with the status quo option, we obtain the following equation for marginal willing-
ness to pay (MWTP) for option i, which is given by the difference in the price between 
option i and the status quo:
MWTP is the willingness to pay for the monthly electricity rates.
4  Results
4.1  Choice from electricity pricing options and its WTP
The estimation results of the conditional logit model are presented in Table 1. Further-























3 In this study, we apply the conditional logit estimation method to estimate the parameters. However, conditional logit 
estimation relies on the assumption of independence from irrelevant alternatives (IIA). Thus, we cannot consider the 
utilities of each alternative to be correlated in this estimation.
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conditional logit estimation. We include alternative-specific constants. We can estimate 
the MWTP for the electricity rate per month based on Eq. (5). Each MWTP is calculated 
by the ratio of the coefficient of each alternative-specific constant (coefficient of “TOU,” 
“CPP,” “RTP,” “DLC” and “DLCCPP” in Table 2) to that of the electricity fee per month 
(coefficient of “month” in Table 2). Based on the calculation results of WTP, time of use 
(TOU) is the most preferable pricing rule for respondents. The second most preferable 
pricing rule for respondents is DLC.4
Previous studies note that consumers do not tend to accept the dynamic pricing rule, 
but our results show that TOU is the most preferable rule for the electricity rate. These 
results imply that consumers want to adapt the dynamic pricing rule in Japan. In fact, 
the WTP of RTP is also high, but consumers also want to avoid the risk of large elec-
tricity price changes. Thus, the WTP of critical peak pricing (CPP) is lower than that 
of other pricing schemes. In addition, the WTP of RTP is similar to that of DLC. These 
results imply that consumers may also accept the DLC for the electricity pricing rule.
4.2  Characteristics of motivating acceptance of dynamic pricing
Next, we discuss how much respondents’ characteristics affect their selection of each 
electricity pricing rule. The conditional logit model cannot include the effect character-
istics of each respondent on the choice of probability of each pricing rule. In this study, 
we apply the multinomial logit model to confirm the effect of respondents’ characteris-
tics for choice probability of each pricing rule. Under the multinomial logit model, the 
observable component of the utility is assumed to be written as
where Xn denotes respondents n’s characteristics. In the conditional logit model, ∑
i=1 Pni = 1 an equivalent model is obtained by defining Vn,i to be deviations of regres-
sors from values of alternative 1, and setting Vn,i = 0. When instead the regressors do 
not vary over alternatives, the multinomial logit model is used (Cameron and Trivedi 
2009). A positive (negative) regression parameter does not mean that an increase in the 
regressor leads to increase (decrease) in the probability of that alternative. Instead, inter-
pretation for the multinomial logit model is relative to the reference.5
4 In addition, we calculate the MWTP for initial cost in each pricing scheme. The MWTP for initial cost is calculated by 
the ratio of the coefficient of each price scheme to that of “First.” Preference ranking of each pricing scheme for initial 
cost and monthly fee is exactly same. This tells we can understand which dynamic pricing rules better for consumers as 
both calculation results of MWTP show the same ranking. However, consumers might not clarify well the difference 
between initial cost and monthly fee.
(6)Vn,i = biXn
5 In this estimation, we define the choice of status quo as the reference.
Table 2 Estimation results of marginal willingness to pay
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The results of the multinomial logit model are shown in Tables  3 (economic incen-
tive rules) and 4 (DLC and general rules). Each variable that we use in our estimation 
is shown in Table 5. We show the descriptive statistics in Table 6. The baseline choice is 
an option of the general rule. “Knowledge” shows a positive correlation with the choice 
probability of TOU and CPP. These results indicate that people with more knowledge 
about electricity conservation tend to choose TOU and CPP but not the real-time pric-
ing scheme. TOU and CPP are easily understandable in terms of the effective timing for 
electricity conservation. RTP is difficult to understand in terms of such timing. Thus, 
people who have more knowledge about electricity conservation prefer TOU and CPP.
“All” and “time” show a negative coefficient with the choice probability of all economic 
incentive schemes. All-electric homes need to manage all energy usage with electricity. 
In short, people who live in such homes need to use more electricity than others do. 
Thus, such people dislike the electricity price change. Furthermore, people who spend a 
considerable amount of time in their home use more electricity than others do. There-
fore, they do not tend to choose the dynamic pricing schemes.
“Education” shows a positive coefficient with the choice probability of all dynamic 
pricing schemes. A high educational background leads to a strong understanding of the 
merit of dynamic pricing schemes. This result shows the characteristic may increase the 
choice probability of dynamic pricing schemes. “Risk” shows a positive coefficient with 
the choice probability of CPP and RTP, but a high-risk preference leads to a decrease in 
the choice probability of DLC and TOU. These results show that consumers consider the 
Table 3 Estimation results of multinomial logit model (economic incentive rules)
* Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Log likelihood is −351,225.27, and 
χ2 (80) is 3411.29
Attributes Economic incentive
TOU CPP RTP
Time-of-use rate Critical peak price Real-time price
Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value
Fee 0.00000004 0.03 −0.0000 −1.61 −0.0000 −0.43
Knowledge 0.0063*** 3.63 0.0098*** 5.45 −0.0031* −1.75
All −0.5624*** −25.33 −0.4675*** −19.98 −0.2586*** −11.14
Family −0.0400*** −3.94 0.0242** 2.33 0.0336*** 3.35
Age −0.0024*** −3.95 −0.0009 −1.37 0.0016** 2.55
Gender 0.0158 1.01 0.0679*** 4.17 0.0923*** 5.86
Education 0.0825*** 18.68 0.0706*** 15.39 0.0756*** 17.08
Income 0.0002*** 7.06 0.0002*** 6.16 0.0003*** 10.61
Risk −0.0184 −1.48 0.0142 1.11 0.0543*** 4.39
Tokyo 0.0350** 2.12 0.0560*** 3.27 0.0641*** 3.90
Time −0.0873*** −5.30 −0.1109*** −6.44 −0.1364*** −8.21
Ownership 0.0373** 2.15 −0.0930*** −5.17 −0.0144 −0.83
Three generations −0.2100*** −6.57 −0.1505*** −4.59 −0.3250*** −10.07
Single‑life −0.1861*** −6.16 −0.1060*** −3.39 −0.1142*** −3.77
Month −0.0000*** −5.85 0.0000*** 2.83 −0.0000*** −5.16
First 0.0000** 2.49 −0.0000** −2.20 −0.0000** −2.45
Constants 0.1435** 2.20 −0.2657*** −3.92 −0.4735*** −7.21
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risk of price change. “Single-life” shows a negative coefficient with the choice probability 
of all dynamic pricing schemes. People who live alone do not want to think about the 
electricity price change, as their consumption is small. They may think of the switching 
of the price rule as bothersome. These results imply that the characteristics of people 
and families affect their choice of a dynamic pricing scheme in the near future.
However, we need to calculate the marginal effect based on the result of the multi-
nomial logit estimation to understand how much each characteristic affects the choice 
probability of each pricing scheme. Tables  7 and 8 show the estimation results of the 
marginal effect based on the results of the multinomial logit estimation. From these 
results, we can understand which characteristics affect pricing scheme choice behav-
ior. For example, these results show that risk preference is one of the important factors 
that influence the choice probability. The “risk” value of most risky people in our sample 
is 3. Thus, high-risk people’s choice probability of RTP increases by approximately 3%. 
Furthermore, we can understand “All” as an important factor for decision making. For 
example, the choice probability of TOU decreases by 4% if the person lives in an all-
electric home.
5  Discussion and conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the WTP for each dynamic pricing rule of electricity based 
on choice experiment. In addition, we analyze what factors influence the choice of each 
dynamic pricing scheme. As a result, we produce several important findings regarding 
consumers’ choice of a dynamic pricing rule.
Table 4 Estimation results of multinomial logit model (DLC and general rule)
Values in parentheses are t values
* Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level. Log likelihood is −351,225.27, and 
χ2 (80) is 3411.29
Attributes Direct load control
DLC Mixed with DLC and CPP
Estimate t value Estimate t value
Fee 0.0000*** 6.66 0.0000*** 6.82
Knowledge 0.0005 0.27 −0.0013 −0.69
All −0.3621*** −15.25 −0.4422*** −18.19
Family 0.0028 0.27 −0.0083 −0.76
Age −0.0021*** −3.21 −0.0014** −2.02
Gender 0.1865*** 11.28 0.2292*** 13.26
Education 0.0568*** 12.33 0.0535*** 11.13
Income 0.0002*** 7.81 0.0003*** 9.73
Risk −0.0234* −1.80 −0.0119 −0.87
Tokyo 0.1331*** 7.77 0.0645*** 3.59
Time 0.0054 0.31 0.0152 0.84
Ownership −0.0572*** −3.16 −0.0457** −2.41
Three generations −0.2039*** −6.18 −0.1654*** −4.82
Single‑life −0.2532*** −7.90 −0.1907*** −5.71
Month 0.0000*** 4.81 −0.0000*** −5.49
First −0.0000* −1.69 −0.0000*** −4.27
Constants −0.4148*** −6.07 −0.4255*** −5.98
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Table 5 List of variables
Variables Definitions Contents
Fee The average electricity rate of spring, sum‑
mer, fall and winter
(The electricity rate is what respondents are 
paying)
Numerical value
Knowledge Respondents’ degree of knowledge 
about energy‑saving behavior (i.e., what 
respondents suppose is a good way to 
save energy use). Variables show the 
number of such questioner choices. Total 
numbers of such questions are 14
1. Turning off the air conditioner
2. Setting the temperature of the air condi‑
tioner to 28 °C
3. Cleaning the air conditioner’s filter  
frequently
4. Turning off the TV frequently when you are 
not watching it
5. Putting the refrigerator in an appropriate 
place
6. Setting the refrigerator’s temperature 
properly
7. Organizing the contents of the refrigerator
8. Setting the temperature of the air condi‑
tioner to 20° in the winter
9. Lowering the temperature setting of the 
water heater
10. Turning on the heater only when neces‑
sary
11. Unplugging electrical products when not 
in use
12. Not leaving the shower running
13. Setting the temperature of electrical 
carpet properly
14. Not reheating a bath
All Whether respondents live in an all‑electric 
home
Respondents live in an all‑electric home = 1
Other = 0
Family The number of households of respondents Numerical value




Age Age of respondent Numerical value
Gender Gender of respondent Male = 1
Female = 0
Education Academic record Respondents graduated from
Primary school = 0
Junior high school = 1
High school = 2
National College of Technology = 3
Vocational school = 4
Junior college = 5
University = 6
Master’s degree program = 7
Doctoral degree program = 8
Income Annual income of respondents Numerical value
Risk The risk‑level preference of respondents Numerical value
Tokyo Whether the respondents live in the Tokyo 
metropolitan area
Respondents lived in the Tokyo metropolitan 
area = 1
Other = 0
Time Whether respondents stay at home almost 
all day
Respondents stay at home almost all day = 1
Other = 0
Ownership Whether respondents live a self‑owned 
home
Respondents live in self‑owned home = 1
Other = 0
Rent Whether respondents live in a rented house Respondents live in rented house = 1
Other = 0
Apart Whether respondents live in an apartment Respondents live in an apartment = 1
Other = 0
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First, TOU is the most preferable pricing rule for consumers. Our estimation results 
show that TOU has the highest value of WTP of all pricing rules. Second, the charac-
teristics of each consumer affect the choice of a pricing rule. Borenstein (2006) notes 
that the risk of a pricing change is one of the important factors in choosing a pricing 
rule. In fact, we find that consumers who have a preference for risk aversion tend not to 
choose the RTP. In addition, our results show several characteristics influence the choice 
of a pricing rule. Our estimation results show that household characteristics are impor-
tant factors in the choice of a dynamic pricing rule (economic incentive schemes and 
DLC). Regarding personal characteristic, a strong academic record increases the choice 
Table 5 continued
Variables Definitions Contents
Couple Whether households of respondents are 
composed of only a married couple
Households of respondents are composed 
only of a married couple = 1
Other = 0
Couple child Whether households of respondents are 
composed of a married couple and a child
Households of respondents are composed of 
a married couple and a child = 1
Other = 0
Three generations Whether households of respondents are 
composed of three generations
Households of respondents are composed of 
three generations = 1
Other = 0
Single‑life Whether respondents live alone Respondents live alone = 1
Other = 0
Month Electricity rate per month Numerical value
First Initial cost to introduce the tool for dynamic 
pricing
Numerical value
Constant Constant term Numerical value
Table 6 Descriptive statistics for multinomial logit model
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Fee 11,122.760 6964.586 500 40,500
Knowledge 5.005 4.270 1 14
All 0.845 0.362 0 1
Family 2.798 1.275 1 9
Age 42.572 14.224 20 60
Education 5.810 1.765 2 9
Income 596.373 360.211 1,500,000 15,000,000
Risk 0.720 0.733 0 3
Gender 0.537 0.499 0 1
Tokyo 0.319 0.466 0 1
Time 0.383 0.486 0 1
Ownership 0.544 0.498 0 1
Rent 0.026 0.160 0 1
Apart 0.166 0.372 0 1
Couple 0.248 0.432 0 1
Couple child 0.449 0.497 0 1
Three generations 0.081 0.273 0 1
Single‑life 0.159 0.365 0 1
Month 12,618.980 12,354.880 1000 40,000
First 7472.510 5108.150 0 15,000
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probability of economic incentive rules. Borenstein (2013) notes that lower-income 
consumers tend to prefer dynamic pricing rule, but our results do not show a robust 
relationship between income and the choice probability of dynamic pricing schemes. 
Table 7 Estimation results of marginal effects (economic incentive rules)
* Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level
Attributes Economic incentive
TOU CPP RTP
Time-of-use rate Critical peak price Real-time price
Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value
Fee −0.0000** −2.54 −0.0000*** −4.70 −0.0000*** −3.23
Knowledge 0.0008*** 3.82 0.0012*** 6.39 −0.0009*** −4.54
All −0.0412*** −17.01 −0.0202*** −8.63 0.0147*** 5.70
Family −0.0078*** −6.42 0.0035*** 3.20 0.0058*** 4.93
Age −0.0003*** −4.12 −0.0000 −0.17 0.0004*** 5.94
Gender −0.0136*** −7.33 −0.0034* −1.92 0.0005 0.29
Education 0.0049*** 9.16 0.0023*** 4.62 0.0036*** 6.74
Income 0.0000 0.22 −0.0000 −0.70 0.0000163*** 5.87
Risk −0.0041*** −2.75 0.0017 1.22 0.0092*** 6.29
Tokyo −0.0039** −2.00 0.0000*** 0.00 0.0015 0.78
Time −0.0058*** −2.95 −0.0087*** −4.69 −0.0146*** −7.44
Ownership 0.0116*** 5.63 −0.0107*** −5.57 0.0020 0.97
Three generations −0.0064* −1.66 0.0039 1.10 −0.0273*** −7.05
Single‑life −0.0092** −2.55 0.0048 1.41 0.0040 1.11
Month −0.0000*** −6.56 0.0000*** 6.55 −0.0000*** −5.46
First 0.0000*** 5.84 −0.0000 −1.50 −0.0000* −1.88
Table 8 Estimation results of marginal effects (DLC and general rule)
* Significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level
Attributes Direct load control
DLC Mixed with DLC and CPP
Estimate t value Estimate t value
Fee 0.0000*** 7.54 0.0000*** 7.54
Knowledge −0.0002 −1.26 −0.0004** −2.47
All −0.0034 −1.47 −0.0135*** −6.29
Family 0.0002 0.13 −0.0013 −1.30
Age −0.0002*** −2.87 −0.0001 −1.16
Gender 0.0148*** 8.54 0.0184*** 11.24
Education 0.0001 0.24 −0.0004 −0.76
Income 0.0000* 1.76 0.0000*** 4.79
Risk −0.0041*** −3.00 −0.0020 −1.57
Tokyo 0.0118*** 6.64 0.0011 0.66
Time 0.0093*** 5.14 0.0093*** 5.47
Ownership −0.0049** −2.59 −0.0027 −1.51
Three generations −0.0044 −1.26 0.0013 0.41
Single‑life −0.0179*** −5.26 −0.0071** −2.24
Month 0.0000*** 9.40 −0.0000*** −5.59
First −0.0000 −0.74 −0.0000*** −4.41
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Therefore, the relationship between the choice of each pricing rule and income level 
could be more complex.
Energy conservation is an important policy problem worldwide. In the near future, 
demand-side control will become a more important policy for countries and regions 
because dynamic pricing schemes are one of the best tools to control the demand of 
electricity. However, many consumers need to support the dynamic pricing rule to 
achieve effective control of energy demand. Therefore, we need to consider not only the 
direct effect of each pricing rule but also whether consumers want to support such a 
pricing rule.
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